The Softer Side of Kant?

In class on Tuesday, Professor Silliman proposed the possibility of reading Kant in a fairly (perhaps overly) generous manner, and I tend to like that interpretation.  In this way, we could understand his claims and examples as intentionally extreme in order to give greater clarity to his essential meaning.  For instance, when Kant suggests that the actions of a person who finds it easy and pleasurable to be kind do not have any real moral worth, as opposed to the actions of a miserable misanthrope who treats people kindly purely out of duty, it is easy to overreact and dismiss this as ridiculous.  Most people naturally find those that genuinely enjoy doing good to be more admirable and praiseworthy.  However, I believe that Kant is making a strong point, if you can see this simply as a technique to achieve clarity.  He is attempting to boil down a moral act to its essence.  And he is saying that the moral worth of the action is found in the rational choice (or will) to act in accordance with the moral law.  Feeling good about doing good is not a bad thing, but it is really just gravy, and should never be the reason for acting morally.  For Kant, morality is fundamentally rational, and the fact that moral action generally tends to make people feel good is simply a pleasant coincidence.