In Defense of Higher and Lower Pleasures

            Although I acknowledge that Mill has serious issues in terms of clarity, and how exactly to distinguish between higher and lower pleasures, I do believe that he is making a very good and important point.  In attempting to save utilitarianism from those that criticize it as crude and degrading, Mill argues that it is actually those critics who “represent human nature in a degrading light” by supposing that human beings are “capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable” (Utilitarianism, p. 913).  He goes on to point out that “human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification” (p. 914).

            Despite its lack of exactness, I think we should bear with Mill on this one.  He is trying to establish that his idea of maximizing “pleasure” is much deeper and more profound than Bentham’s.  To illustrate this, perhaps it would better, rather than trying to compare Madonna to Beethoven or the WWE to Shakespeare, to instead focus on some of the greatest possible human pleasures.  For instance, couldn’t it be argued that having a sense of dignity and self-respect is one of the highest pleasures a person can feel?  Or, similarly, we all like to acknowledge (when refuting Kant) that doing the right thing or being kind makes us feel good about ourselves.  Further, most people would agree that these types of “pleasures” are qualitatively different than the pleasure we get from, say, eating chocolate.  And as a result, we would not trade the former for the latter, even if it meant less pleasure (of the lower kind) in the short run.  Of course, people do make these trade offs, but usually feel bad about it.  Take as another example, the difference between how a healthy lifestyle can genuinely make us feel good, and how eating really bad food can be temporarily pleasurable.  Essentially, Mill is saying that humans can “feel good” in ways that make physical gratification seem irrelevant, and a proper utilitarian calculus should take that into account.